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General Saltzman AMOS Transcript

Before I begin today, I would like to express our sincere appreciation and support for the brave people of Maui as they continue to grapple with the aftermath of the devastating wildfires. I know this has been a challenging time for everyone, but I am filled with admiration for the collective strength and resilience of the people of Maui. The Space Force is proud to be part of the Maui community, and we are here to support the community in any way we can.


I was able to meet with some of the members of the informal Maui Tech Hui yesterday, which consists of the 15th Space Surveillance Squadron, a number of industry partners, as well as commercial startups who deployed Starlink terminals to the west side. The Starlink systems that were placed at key spots, like in Lahaina, were a big help for those who were sheltering in place but did not have access to power or communications. The terminals not only served their designated purpose, but they also helped first responders with communications support – and they helped nearby residents by providing them with charging stations and even refrigerator and freezer capability off the truck mounted mobile terminals. I speak on behalf of the entire Space Force when I say, thanks to all for pitching in to help the Maui community during this difficult time.


I’m also pleased we were able to work with the Maui community to ensure that this conference did not interfere with local recovery efforts and I encourage everyone who attends this week to take advantage of or share stories from volunteer work in support of the people of Lahaina.The AMOS Conference is one of the premiere conferences on space domain awareness, and being able to host here strengthens our connections to the local community and enables our nation’s ability to improve our space domain awareness efforts.


Our 15th Space Surveillance Squadron is unique within the Space Force, it directly fuses space domain awareness operations with research and development. The 15th is a component of Space Delta 2, as well as operates experimental research and development systems under the Air Force Research Laboratory. The site atop Haleakala was built in the 1960s as an electro-optical observation platform for missile tests, and it has evolved into a world-class observatory supporting missions in space control, space sustainability, and other related fields. In addition to being called “The Neighborhood Watch of Space,” the 15th Space Surveillance Squadron is committed to being good neighbors or Hoa nohos to the people of Maui.


As you may have heard, the Secretary of the Air Force has been talking about optimizing the Department for the return of Great Power Competition. The Space Force is committed to this effort, and we remain closely aligned with our sister service and the Secretariat. Under Secretary Kendall’s leadership, and with strong partners in the Air Force and other services, we have done a lot in a short time.

For example, the Space Developmental Agency, which stood up in 2019, just launched their second set of Tranche satellites, a technology demonstrator designed to build resilience for the future hybrid space architecture. This proliferated constellation’s purpose is to deliver tactical and sensor data to address advanced threats like hypersonic missiles. A government organization 4 years old launching and operating 23 satellites, so soon after standup, is a feat unheard of a decade ago.

We have also stood up the Department of Defense’s first and only xGEO and Cislunar space domain awareness mission. Space Delta 2 along with the 15th and 19th Space Surveillance Squadrons did this by developing relationships with industry and academia, leveraging commercial tools and capabilities, building training for operators,identifying capability needs for both command and control and sensors,and developing Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures to support this new mission.

But these “wins” are not enough if we are going to outpace our competitors. Today’s space domain is far different from the one I started operating in back in 1998. We live in a considerably more dynamic and dangerous security environment around the world, which has an impact on all domains including space. For one, there are many more satellites up there to operate.


This historic growth of activity in the space domain was the genesis of the Space Force – a military service specifically focused on addressing the challenges and opportunities in the domain. And we were created for this new space era – an era increasingly driven by this new Great Power Competition.

We have a real-time example of this competition playing out today. As the conflict in Ukraine has shown us, space is critical to modern warfare. In Ukraine, space has played a vital role in communications, positioning, navigation, and timing, missile warning, and C4ISR to allies and partners.

And commercial augmentation has proven its value during this conflict – it is unclassified, promotes shareability across allies, partners, and industry, and often supplements classified data. Commercial augmentation enables more distributed mission assets for our allies and partners.


And those commercial capabilities will only become more important going forward – particularly as we look to the greater resilience inherent in proliferated, disaggregated, and hybrid constellations.

Along the same lines, we need to look at our vulnerabilities in all three segments of space operations: on-orbit systems, communications and data links, and ground stations. We cannot afford any of these segments to be an exploitable vulnerability to our space missions – space is too critical to have a single point of failure anywhere.


But protecting hardware and infrastructure is not enough. We need to collectively maximize our efficiency and effectiveness given the unique requirements of the space domain in the midst of the Great Power Competition. So, we have been taking a long, hard look at our mission and how we talk about it.

In fact, we’ve recently updated our mission statement to better describe who we are and what we do: “Secure our Nation’s Interests In, From, and To Space”…


It clearly reflects our purpose and identity as Guardians. This new mission statement is the first step in creating what I call the Foundational Service Framework; defining the “Why” of the Space Force. It helps clarify what the Department of Defense tasks us to do each and every day.

In the military sense, our task of securing the space domain is as a reflection of the Space Force’s charge…To prepare ourselves to control the space domain, with force, if necessary, as part of the Joint Force while also protecting the security and prosperity our Nation derives from space. And since so many Joint Force operations depend on space capabilities and protection from space-enabled attacks, our Guardians are an integral part of the Joint team.


Our mission statement also touches on the core functions of the Space Force. The core functions are the “What” a service does. Every military service, regardless of domain, must field forces capable of three core operational activities: access to the domain, control of the domain, and exploitation of the domain in order to ensure the security and sustainability of the domain not just for the U.S., but for all of our Allies and Partners.

First, a service must be able to control its domain in order to enable the other two functions. For the Space Force, Space Superiority is the first core function, and it is the “In” aspect of the mission statement. It is the ability to contest and, when necessary, control the domain at a time and place of our choosing. These activities protect the Joint Force and Nation from space and counterspace threats. In today’s congested and contested environment, control of the domain is an operational imperative.

As a service, we must be able to control our domain – through air superiority, sea control, land dominance… and now space superiority. Only once a service has control of its domain, can it then perform its other missions. Control is a prerequisite… because if we can’t control our domain, our ability to utilize it is severely limited.


This leads us to our second core function, Global Mission Operations or the “From” space defined in the mission statement. This is how the Space Force as a military service utilizes the domain…with operations that enable the Joint Force to integrate the joint functions across all domains… on a global scale. That last piece is particularly important, because only the U.S. Space Force can provide the truly world-wide capabilities our forces require as they defend U.S. and Allied interests across this planet. The joint force needs global communications, it needs global indications and warning, and it needs global precision. The Space Force gives them that, day in and day out.


And Guardians secure the Nation’s interests “To” space by assuring we have the ability to launch satellites into orbit and then connect to and control them with a global ground network. We refer to this as Access to Space and it is the third and final core function.


For the Space Force, that access to the space domain takes the form of two characteristics: launch capabilities and the satellite control network – the network that establishes the radio frequency links to the satellites, in order to command, download mission data, or transfer information between satellites.

Taken together, the mission statement and our core functions provide our Guardians with shared purpose and a common understanding of our overall strategy. It allows us, as a service, to ensure the safety and security of the domain for all who wish to use it.


The situation in Ukraine has not just demonstrated the criticality of space in the changing character of warfare but the importance of timely coordination among allies, with alliances that share a common set of standards. So, as we continue to build and prepare for future competition in space, there is no question that the viability of our efforts rests on our ability to build a coalition to uphold and strengthen a rules-based international order for space.


To that end, we still have much to do to normalize space operations. Success in the space domain is the ultimate team sport, and our international partnerships are critical to ensuring that success.

In particular, success in the space domain also requires comprehensive and actionable space domain awareness. We must understand what's happening in space to ensure safe operations, while simultaneously monitoring for behaviors that are irresponsible… or even hostile.


Because any conflict in space has global ramifications, space domain awareness must be a collective effort. A shared understanding of the domain enables the coalition to have actionable, cooperative decision-making, it helps promote responsible behaviors, and enables appropriate responses that avoid unnecessary escalation when confronted with malign, irresponsible, or dangerous actions.

I firmly believe that we must normalize how we collectively operate in this domain by building a coalition Space Domain Awareness framework. We need to continue the shared strength of interoperability we see in other domains. We need globally distributed sensors. We need our allies AND industry partners collecting, securing,and sharing data with each other. This call to action requires work such as common data standards, strong cybersecurity principles, lowered classifications, and an inherent belief in the security and sustainability of the space domain for future generations.


However, we must not neglect that all space users will be in the combat zone during a conflict that extends into space. You cannot separate civilian, commercial, and military assets in this domain. You cannot stop satellites from passing overhead active conflict zones on Earth. You have civilian, commercial, and military assets sharing orbits and operating in close proximity. We all share the risk if war comes to space.I believe there are ways to mitigate this risk. As we’ve learned before, mutual understanding, interoperable equipment, common communications, and network infrastructure… These are the building blocks of success.


If we ignore these lessons, space assets could be disconnected from the greater effort… and operational effectiveness would suffer as a result. To implement these lessons in space we must collectively build tactics, techniques, and procedures, train like we fight, and operate together…just like we do in every domain.


The bottom line is that cooperation is absolutely essential! Successfully achieving a safe, stable, secure, and sustainable domain will rest on our ability to collectively work together and normalize space operations in the same vein as our agreements in the air, land, and sea domains. To not do so will invite crippling attacks on space infrastructure – infrastructure that underpins most of our terrestrial force designs, as well as the modern way of life.


And that cooperation extends across government agencies as well. As we look to the future of our increasingly congested space domain, we are working very closely with the Department of Commerce to ensure our compliance with Space Policy Directive-3. The White House issued this directive to allow the Space Force to focus on maintaining access to, and freedom of action in space, with Commerce responsible for the publicly releasable portion of the DoD catalog and for administering an open architecture data repository.


Since then, we’ve been working together to develop a new approach to space traffic management – one that addresses current AND future operational risks. This new approach must set priorities for space situational awareness and encourage the growth of our commercial space sector. We continue to work together to establish an effective space traffic management architecture, all while promoting shared space safety standards and best practices across the international community.


The Commerce Department has established a Commercial Space Coordination Committee and an Office of Space Commerce. Both are already meeting with industry officials to discuss next steps in crafting a space traffic coordination system – including satellite operators – all with the goal of encouraging better sharing of spacecraft location data with both the government and other commercial operators.

Of note, the Office of Space Commerce received $70 million for FY 2023, with the majority of that funding going into the space situational awareness system that Commerce was tasked to develop. And they’re making good progress fielding the initial operating capability of the system – which they have rebranded as “TraCSS” – the Traffic Coordination System for Space.


Earlier this year, the Office of Space Commerce and DoD wrapped up a two-month pilot project that provided valuable insights into the system – insights that have been incorporated into the planning for TraCSS going forward.


In some ways, I feel I’m in “receive mode” as there is so much work to do, that any guidance would stand to vector within the realm of possible. Now, with that said, it’s worth noting that Delta 2’s mission and vision will change very little when Space Traffic Management officially transitions to Commerce. We’ll keep the lines of communication open as this process continues to evolve.


In closing, I’d like to offer that the conflict in Ukraine has made it clear: access to and the use of space is fundamental to modern warfare. Our adversaries are constantly looking for ways to negate our advantage in space.


It is also clear that technology is a force enabler that must be supported by integrated training and coalition operations. Historically, space has been an area of unilateral action… this must change… We need to work together as responsible actors to protect and defend against activities that undermine the safety and security of space. We need to improve cooperation, coordination, and opportunities for interoperability. We need to – collectively – sustain freedom of action in space, optimize resources, enhance mission assurance and resilience, and deter conflict.


We also need to increase our collaboration with the commercial space industry to enable new capabilities that support integrated deterrence and space domain awareness – integration that includes data sharing and interoperability between our allies and industry partners.


The process has begun. We’re already collaborating better than ever, with more to come. So, thank you. Not just for the opportunity to speak today, but for what you do, for being here as part of this important conversation, and for your continuing support for the people of Mauiand our Nation. I look forward to working with you all in the challenging years ahead.


Semper Supra! And:

Mahalo nui loa


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